INTRODUCTION
It has been much remarked that different solutions become equivalent in the setting of private goods economies in which there is``perfect competition,'' i.e., no single individual can affect the overall outcome. The conjecture that core and competitive allocations coincide was made as far back as 1881 by Edgeworth [15] . This insight has been confirmed in a series of papers [1, 2, 9 11, 13, 14, 16, 20 22, 28] over the last four decades. Another line of inquiry originated with the recent introduction of a value article no. ET962273 for games by Shapley [25, 26] . It was found that with a smoothness assumption on preferences value allocations also coincided with the above two solutions [4, 8, 14, 27] . 1 The equivalence phenomenon is striking in view of the fact that these solutions are posited on entirely different grounds. Let us briefly recount them. We will confine ourselves throughout to pure exchange economies, and will work with a set of these called M . To represent perfect competition, the underlying space of traders in M is a non-atomic continuum (T, C, +). (See Aumann's model in [2] .) T is the set of traders, C the sigma-algebra of coalitions and + a finite, non-atomic, non-negative population measure on (T, C). An ordinal economy consists of a pair of functions (a, p ) which specify the characteristics of the traders. If n is the number of commodities in the economy, then the function a maps 2 T to R n + and p maps T to preference relations on R n + . Denote a(t), p(t) by a t , p t . The jth component a t j of a t is the initial endowment of commodity j held by trader t; and : p t ; means that t likes the``consumption bundle'' : no less than ;. The domain M is made up of pairs (a, p) which are subject to certain constraints. This will be made precise in Section 2. But, roughly, (T, C, +) is held fixed in M while the characteristics a, p are allowed to vary. In particular there can be an arbitrary finite number of commodities. The initial endowment a is assumed to be bounded. The essential constraint on p is that each p t be smooth, convex and monotonic. Fix an ordinal economy m=(a, p) in M . For any coalition S in C, an S-allocation is an integrable map x : S Ä R n + such that S x d+= S a d+. It describes a redistribution of commodities among the members of S. (T-allocations will often be called just``allocations.'') Also denote by o t (and, t t ) the strict preference (and, indifference) induced by p t , i.e., :o t ; if : p t ; and it is not the case that ; p t : (and, :t t ; if : p t ; and ; p t :). Competitive allocations in m are based on the idea of a state of``equilibrium'' that is arrived at via the``law of supply and demand.'' There are prices p # R and the resulting allocation is called competitive. In symbols, x : T Ä R n + is competitive with prices p # R n + if x t is p t -optimal in [: # R n + : p } : p } a t ] for almost all t, and T x t d+= T a t d+. On the other hand, the models behind the core and the value are considerably different. They both depend on the full game underlying the economy. An allocation is defined to belong to the core if no coalition can, on its own, improve upon it. More precisely, take an allocation y. If there does not exist any non-null S # C and an S-allocation z such that z t o t y t for all t in S, then y is in the core of m. Thus the core represents a region of coalitional stability in the space of allocations. In contrast, a value allocation may be viewed as an arbitrated outcome of the game. For a thoroughgoing discussion we refer the reader to [4] . Here let us simply recall how it is determined. First assign utilities 3 u : T_R n + Ä R to represent the preferences p, i.e., denoting u(t, x)#u t (x), u t (x)>u t ( y) if and only if x o t y. Then u generates the market game w a, u : C Ä R by the rule w (a, u) (S)=sup
The number w (a, u) (S) can be interpreted (see [4, 8] ) as the maximum welfare (under the representation u of p) that S can guarantee to itself, no matter what the other players do. Let 4w (a, u) : C Ä R be the Shapley value of the game w (a, u) . (For a description of 4, see [8] .) In the context at hand, the value assigns to each trader t, the``contribution'' made by him to social welfare, i.e.,``the amount of welfare added to society by his presence'' (see [4] ). Also, for an allocation x in (a, u) let u x : C Ä R be the payoff generated by x, i.e., u x (S)= S u t (x t ) d+. Then x in m=(a, p) is called a valve-allocation if we can find a utility-representation u for p such that u x =4w (a, u) . In other words it is an allocation at which, for some choice of individual utilities, each trader gets precisely his contribution to the welfare of society.
The three solutions competitive, core, and value allocations are, in general, quite different from each other. It is a remarkable fact that they become equivalent on M . In this paper we make an attempt to understand the equivalence phenomenon. 4 The question is: what are the crucial properties that are common across these solutions and on which at bottom the equivalence depends? To set the stage for the analysis, we take a map . on M which maps each economy m to a nonempty subset .(m) of allocations in m. We restrict ourselves to the case where the elements of .(m) are both individually rational and Pareto-optimal in m. Then we look for an irreducible list of axioms on . that will uniquely categorize . as the coincident competitive-core-value correspondence. Four axioms are presented which accomplish the job. They are named the``anonymity'',``equity'',`c onsistency'' and``restricted continuity'' axioms. This may be viewed as a``meta-equivalence'' theorem. For instance the fact that the value, core and competitive allocations coincide would follow from our result once it is verified that each of the maps From another point of view our result also sheds new light on the nature of the competitive equilibrium itself. The direct definition is``local.'' It is based, as we saw, on a model of individualistic optimization of trade in the presence of fixed prices. And it refers only to the characteristics a, p of a single economy. But our axioms, since they categorize it, also serve as a definition of the competitive correspondence on M . Here a space of economies is needed, and the axioms express``global'' properties, in which two or more economies are compared to each other. Worthy of note is the fact that the spirit of our axioms is quite different from that of the competitive equilibrium definition. Nowhere is the existence of prices put into the axioms. Nor is it postulated that traders behave like individual optimizers. Nor indeed is any notion of coalitional stability invoked. Instead our approach is akin to that taken in the study of social choice. The solution is viewed in its entirety on the whole domain M and we introduce certain constraints on its global behaviour via the axioms.
To describe the axioms, a little more notation is needed. For m=(a, p), let A(m) be the set of all bounded allocations x in m that are individually rational and Pareto-optimal i.e., x t p t a t for almost all t # T, and there does not exist any allocation y in m such that y t o t x t for almost all t # T. Consider a map Our first axiom says that no traits of a trader count for anything in the economy other than his endowments and preferences: he is fully characterized by these two items. To make this formal, let 3 be a +-measure-preserving automorphism of (T, C, +) and take m=(a, p). Define the economy 3m by relabelling the traders according to 3, i.e., 3m=(3a, 3p ), where (3a)
t =a 3(t) and (3p ) t = p 3(t) . Then . (3m) consists precisely of the (relabelled) allocations 3x for x in . (m). Summing up:
Axiom I (Anonymity). Suppose m # M and 3 is a +-measure-preserving automorphism of (T, C). Then . (3m)=3. (m).
Our next axiom asserts the existence of an allocation in the solution, in which traders with identical characteristics are treated at par.
for almost all t and t$ in T.
(It will suffice, in fact, to require Equity to hold only in the context of finite-type economies. See Axiom B in Section 2.)
The consistency axiom has to do with enlarging or reducing the set of commodities in an economy. Suppose m=(a, p), m$=(a$, p$) and m * =(a * , p * ) are three economies in M with k, l and k+l commodities respectively.
Consider any (x, y) # R k+l + , where
The economies m and m$ constitute, in some sense, a factorization of m * . One might wonder if it should be possible to arrive at a solution of m * by solving each of the``sub-economies'' separately and then putting together their solutions (i.e., if``partial equilibrium'' analysis fits into the general). But the problem is that m and m$ are not exactly``non-interacting'' parts of m * . While, by (b), p * is consistent with p and p$,``cross-effects'' may appear, so that when we compose solutions of m and m$, the resultant allocation in m * need not be Pareto-optimal there. Since we insist that . be Pareto-optimal we cannot, at the same time, require . to compose across the constituent sub-economies without qualification. At the very least we would have to put in the clause:``if this does not violate Paretooptimality.'' This is precisely the content 5 of part (i). Part (ii) may be described as follows. If there is no trade in the last l commodities at a solution (x, y) of m * , then . will induce the allocation x in m. This is because, being untraded, the l commodities will not appear in the economy, so that in effect we will be``left observing'' just x in m. But . acts directly on m also. Thus (ii) says that the action of . induced on a sub-economy m should be consistent with the direct action of . on m. (The commodities that are not traded are like``irrelevant commodities'' and the sub-economy is``independent'' of them.)
Finally we turn to restricted continuity. Two versions can be given, called axioms IV and IV$ below. The latter is particularly easy to state. Indeed, using & & to denote the bounded variation norm (see [8] ), we have:
Axiom IV$. For any =>0 there exists $>0 such that for any two representations (a, u), (aÄ , uÄ ) of economies in M :
(The reader who wishes to quickly see one version of our theorem is invited, at this point, to skip ahead and read it with IV$ in place of IV. The theorem is stated in the introduction in italics just after the discussion of axiom IV.) 319 EQUIVALENCE PRINCIPLE Axiom IV$ is much stronger than IV. To the extent that it depicts a property of``coincident solutions'' on the domain M , its strength is a virtue. But, for the meta-equivalence aspect of our result, it is preferable to cast the axioms in as weak a form as possible, and to bring the maximum number of solutions within their ambit. Therefore we will focus on Axiom IV, even though some``build up'' is required before it can be stated. As we shall see, Axiom IV has a more intuitive flavour than IV$, and being weaker applies more widely than IV$. For instance it can be verified that the``NTU-Harsanyi value'' (see [19] ; also [17, 18] ) satisfies IV but not IV$; and, working with IV, we find that the Harsanyi value fails to be equivalent to the other classical solutions not because it violates continuity but on account of the fact that it is not consistent in our sense.
The rough idea in Axiom IV is that . must be continuous over economies for which a``natural'' notion of``nearness'' can be defined. Of course the words within quotes must be made precise.
The conditions we impose on our economies are``classical'' (as in [8] ), and in particular they require that utilities eventually grow slower that any linear function (see (2.4)$ in Section 2). Thus``transferable-utility-like'' (TU-like) economies are excluded in M . Nevertheless we will motivate our discussion of continuity by first recalling TU-like economies, since a very simple concept of distance exists for them.
Consider m=(a, p). Suppose there exists a utility representation u :
for almost all t # S, where x is an S-allocation] and
f is measurable and S f d+ w a, u (S), f (t) u t (a t ) for almost all t # S] are equal for all S # C, i.e., the individually rational`p ayoffs'' of any coalition S (given by the first set) correspond to redistributions of the number w a, u (S). When this happens we say that the representation (a, u) of (a, p) is TU-like.
It is worth emphasizing that there is no transfer of utilities that is in fact conceived in the above picture. Our basic focus is only on V (a, u) If it turns out (and this will happen for very rare (a, u)) that
Given (a, u) and (a~, u~), both of which are TU-like, there is a natural notion of distance between them, namely &w (a, u) &w a~, a~) &, where & & denotes the bounded variation norm (see [8] ; and also Section 2). This distance looks at (a, u) and (a~, u~) in payoff (or utility) space, forgetting about the detailed microdata of endowments and preferences (including even the numbers of underlying commodities in the two economies).
There are no (a, u) in our domain that are exactly TU-like. But, if we do not look at them``too closely,'' then some of the (a, u) appear to be TUlike, permitting us to talk about how close they are to each other. To make this idea precise, let S # C be a coalition and f : S Ä R an integrable (payoff) function. We want to describe the idea of``observing'' f not at each point t # S (i.e., not each f (t)), but at a coarser, more aggregated``macrolevel.'' Suppose this level is $>0. (As $ becomes smaller the observation will be finer). Let P=[S 1 , ..., S q ] be a partition of S with +(S i ) $+(S) for 1 i q. (Such partitions will be called $-partitions of S.) Then the observation of f through P, denoted f | P , is defined by
An economy (aÄ , uÄ ) is said to be a $-approximation of the economy (a, u) if:
(1) for all S # C and all $-partitions of S,
and
Condition (1) says that both (a, u) and (aÄ , uÄ ) are TU-like at the level $ (the smaller $, is the more TU-like they are); and (2) says that viewing these nearly TU-like representations as TU, the bounded variation distance between them is less than $. Define
For an allocation z and utilities u, recall the set function u z : C Ä R, given by u z (S)= S u t (z t ) d+.
Axiom IV (Restricted Continuity). For any =>0 there exists a $>0 such that for any two representations (a, u), (aÄ , uÄ ) of economies in M :
Note that this axiom is stated in payoff space. It abstracts from the microdata of the economies, and of their solutions, and looks at the images of both in payoff space, with the aid of utility representations. Then it says that if two economies (represented in payoff space) are nearly TU-like and close, so are any two``TU-compatible'' points in their solutions (correspondingly represented in payoff space). In other words, only those points are considered which are compatible with the TU view, i.e. [u
, equivalently u x (T)=w (a, u) (T) (and similarly for y).
Should the payoffs in .(a, u) depend only on V (a, u) (and not on the finer microdata given by a and u)? Once we agree to this, i.e., to factor the payoffs [u x : x # .(a, u)] through V (a, u) , the continuity assumption is seen to be relatively mild. It restricts attention to pairs (a, u), (aÄ , uÄ ), which form a very``thin'' set in M _M , and for which a measure of closeness is quite naturally defined.
Consider
We are not concerned here with the allocations x in .(a, u), but rather with the payoffs that arise from these allocations. But the moment we confine our attention to payoffs, V (a, u) provides`s ufficient statistics'' for (a, u). The entire story of payoffs in the economy (a, u) is told for S by the set V (a, u) (S). The details contained in a and u, including number of underlying commodities, is irrelevant. This is so for all coalitions S. So, in payoff space, the economy (a, u)``equals'' V (a, u) . It is then only natural to conclude that the associated payoffs [u x : x # .(a, u)] of .(a, u) are a function of V (a, u) alone. Notice that in Axiom IV we do not use the full force of this argument, for we restrict to economies which are nearly TU-like, and to payoffs which are TU-compatible.
Our result is:
Theorem A. There is one, and only one, admissible . on M which satisfies Axioms I, II, III, IV and it is the competitive correspondence: m [ set of competitive allocations in m.
In fact we actually prove a stronger result than this. To make the distinction it will be necessary to turn to cardinal economies. Our approach so far has been a strictly ordinal one. Even though utilities u : T_R n + Ä R did often show up in the analysis, they were brought in only as a convenient device to refer to properties of the ordinal preferences (which would have been painful to state otherwise). In short there was no role played by u other than to represent p. It is true that we could have defined . directly on pairs (a, u) rather than on (a, p) but then, implicit in our analysis, was the assumption if u and w both represent p, then .(a, u)=.(a, w).
(V)
One might ask what happens if utilities are taken into account. We will adopt the cardinal point of view, in which what matters are the intra-personal comparisons of utility differences (u
Thus two utilities u and u~must be deemed to be the same if (for almost all t) u t ( } )=q t +* t u~t( } ) for some choice of measurable functions q : T Ä R and * : T Ä R ++ . We say that u and u~are``cardinally equivalent'' in this case. If (a, u) and (a, u~) are two economies with the same endowments, and cardinally equivalent utilities, we write (a, u)t(a, u~).
Let M denote a set of cardinal economies (a, u), and consider . : M Ä sets of allocations. The fact that . is a cardinal solution is summed up by
The condition (VV) is much weaker than (V). It leaves open the possibility that .(a, u) and .(a, u$) may differ even when u and u$ represent the same ordinal preference.
To any ordinal economy m=(a, p) we can attach a subset
There is no a-priori reason to expect . to be constant across the different cardinal economies in L(m). However, we will impose watered-down versions of the previous four axioms (see Axioms A, B, C, D of Section 2) on . and show that even then the competitive correspondence is categorically determined. (See Theorem B in Section 4) Thus the ordinal character of . given by (V) i.e., the invariance of . on L(m) is deduced starting with the purely cardinal viewpoint of (VV). This is stronger than the ordinal result on . that we cited earlier. For Axiom I (II, III, IV) implies Axiom A (B, C, D) in general, and the converse is only true in the presence of (V). Ex-post, of course, both sets of axioms yield the competitive correspondence on M. However, if we step outside of M, the ordinal axioms are far more stringent than the cardinal. For instance, if T consists of two traders, the Nash bargaining solution satisfies A, B, C, D but not I, II, III, IV.
Returning to the ordinal economies in M we know that even stronger properties hold for the competitive correspondence than those depicted in I, II, III, IV, and we could equally well have started with them. But, keeping the meta-equivalence aspect of our result in mind, we have attempted to put the axioms in as weak a form as possible and to show that they still categorize the competitive correspondence. It was this that motivated our choice of the cardinal context over the ordinal one.
It must be stressed that our analysis holds up in the context of M alone. Dropping either the non-atomicity of the trader-set or the smoothness of utilities would make our theorem break down. But then the equivalence of ] with its Borel sets. T is the set of agents, C the _-algebra of coalitions, and + the population measure. We assume that + is finite, _-additive, non-negative and non-atomic. W.l.o.g. +(T )=1.
NON-ATOMIC SMOOTH CARDINAL ECONOMIES
A cardinal economy 6 with n commodities is a pair (a, u), where a: T Ä R n + and u: T_R n + Ä R. Here a(t)#a t is the initial endowment of agent t and u(t, } )#u t ( } ) the utility function of agent t. To describe the conditions on (a, u), first some notation. Let f be a realvalued function on R 
where e k denotes the kth unit direction in R l , provided the limit exists. (We will often denote the gradient ( f 1 ( y), ..., f l ( y)) by {f ( y).) Finally, given S # C,``almost all t in S'' (abbreviated a.a.t in S) means all t in S except for a +-null subset of S; and a.a.t means a.a.t in T.
When a function g from T (or T_R 
t in T.
A weaker version of (ii) will also be used: g is uniformly bounded (or uniformly positive) on compact sets if, for every compact set K, there exists b # R l ++ such that g(t, x) b (or g(t, x) b) for all x # K and a.a.t in T.
The set M of cardinal economies consists of all measurable pairs (a, u) which satisfy the conditions ((2.1) till (2.7)) below: For some of our results we can weaken (2.4) to (2.4)$ u t =o(&x&) as &x& Ä , uniformly in t; i.e., for every =>0, there exists '>0 such that |u t (x)| <= &x& whenever &x&>', for a.a.t in T
With this weaker restriction, we get a larger class of economies M$, which includes M, and for which many of our results continue to hold.
Also the boundedness of the initial allocation a (in assumption 2.1) can be dispensed with, provided we strengthen the anonymity axiom and modify some of the conditions on u (See Remark 9).
For m=(a, u) in M and S # C, an S-allocation is an integrable x: S Ä R n + with T x d+= T a d+. A T-allocation x is defined to be:
for a.a.t in T;
Pareto-optimal (P.O.) if there is no T-allocation y with u t ( y t )>u t (x t ) for a.a.t in T.
For m=(a, u) in M, we denote by A(m) the set of all bounded T-allocations that are I.R. and P.O.
Given S # C, also define
t (a t ) for a.a.t in S and S f d+ w m (S)] Let P=[S 1 , ..., S q ] be a measurable partition of S # C. For any integrable f: S Ä R, let f |P=( S1 f d+, ..., Sq f d+). Define
A $-partition of S is a measurable partition P=[S 1 , ..., S q ] of S with +(S i )>$+(S) for 1 i q. We denote by M($) the set of all economies m in M such that, for every S # C and every $-partition P of S,
In short, M($) is the set of economies that are T.U. -like at the level $, as discussed in the introduction.
COMPETITIVE, CORE, AND VALUE ALLOCATIONS
Fix m=(a, u) # M and a T-allocation x of m. Then x is called a competitive allocation if there exists a p # R n + such that
for a.a.t. Also x is a core allocation of m if there does not exist any S-allocation y with +(S)>0 and u t ( y t )>u t (x t ) for a.a.t in S. To define value allocations, we first turn to cardinal equivalence. Two economies m=(a, u) and m Ä =(aÄ , uÄ ) in M are called cardinally equivalent if a=aÄ , and there exists a measurable * : T Ä R ++ such that u t =*(t) uÄ t for a.a.t. in T. In this case we write mtm Ä . It is easily checked that t is an equivalence relation on M.
Also recall from [8] 
The first requirement says that . selects from individually rational and Pareto-optimal allocations; the second says that . is a cardinal solution (see (VV) of Introduction); the third says that T-allocations which are payoff-equivalent are treated at par by ., and is in keeping with our pointof-view of factoring the solutions through payoff space. (This last requirement will reappear more forcibly when we discuss the continuity axiom below). For any (a, u) and a +-measure-preserving automorphism 3 of (T, C, +) define (3a, 3u) by (3a)
t =a 3(t) , (3u) t =u 3(t) .
Axiom A (Anonymity). If (a, u) # M and 3 is a +-measure-preserving automorphism of (T, C), then .(3a, 3u)=3.(a, u).
Given a partition of T into sets T 1 , ..., T k in C, we say that (a, u) has types T 1 , ..., T k if a t =a t$ and u t =u t$ for all t, t$ # T i and all 1 i k.
Axiom B (Equity). If (a, u) # M has types T 1 , ..., T k then there exists an x # .(a, u) such that u t (x t )=u t$ (x t$ ) for all t, t$ # T i and all 1 i k.
Let (a, u), (a^, u^), (a~, u~) be economies in M with l, k, l+k commodities respectively. Write (a~, u~)=(a, u)_(a^, u^) if, for almost all t # T, a~t=(a t , a^t)
u~t(x, y)=u t (x)+u^t( y).
Axiom C (Consistency). Suppose (a, u), (a^, u^), (a~, u~) # M, and (a~, u~)= (a, u)_(a^, u^). Then
Note that this is weaker than Axiom III, since (a~, u~)=(a, u)_(a^, u^) implies (a~, u~)=(a, u) (a^, u^) but not vice versa. For example, any twocommodity economy decomposes in the obvious way into two one-commodity subeconomies in the sense of`` '', but rarely in the sense of``_''.
As was pointed out in the introduction, there are two axioms of continuity, either of which suffice for the theorem. The first, which we call Axiom D$, is stated exactly as Axiom IV$ of the ordinal case. But, for reasons already discussed, we will focus on the other version. First recall from [8] Define (The theorem also holds with axiom D$ in place of D).
PROOF OF THEOREM B
For a straight proof of the theorem, the reader could read M in place of M$ throughout what follows. But part of the equivalence is valid on the larger domain M$ (see Remark 5 in Section 6). In order to bring this out, we have stated various lemmas and remarks for M$, even though this occasionally entails longer proofs.
For 1 k n denote by e k the k-th unit vector in R n , and recall that u t k is the directional derivative of u t in the direction e k , (see beginning of Section 2). Proof. Let x be a Pareto-optimal allocation in (a, u). According to the well-known``welfare theorem'' (see, e.g., Theorem 4 in Section 4.3 of [20] ) there exists p # R n + , p{0, such that x is a competitive allocation of the economy (x, u) with prices p. Moreover, by condition (2.5) on the utilities, it is clear that p>0. Consider any t with x t (x)=o(&x&) uniformly in t (i.e., for every =>0, there is a '>0 such that, for a.a.t. in T, |u t (x)| = &x& whenever &x& ').
W.l.o.g. we assume (given (1)) that &a t & 1 for almost all t in T. By (2), there exists M & >0 such that, for almost all t # T and 1 j n, u t j ( y)>M & whenever & y& 2. Also, by (3), it follows that there exists K>1 such that, for almost all t in T, u t (x)<M & &x& if &x& K. Let S be a coalition and let x be an S-allocation such that +[t # S :
, and therefore by Lyapunov's theorem there exists a measurable subset S + (=) of S + , with
i.e.,
Consider the S-allocation x(=) that is given by
For an integrable function y from S into a Euclidean space, and measurable R/S we denote the integral R y d+ by y(R). Note that
For sufficiently small =>0, &x
Lemma 3. Let m=(a, u~) be an economy in M$ and let x # A(m). Then, there exists measurable * : T Ä R ++ (which is unique almost everywhere up to multiplication by a scalar) and a vector p>0 such that (i) * is bounded and uniformly positive; (ii) *(t) {u~t(x t )= p for a.a.t in T;
(iii) if we set u t =*(t)u~t, then
Proof. Note that u t (0)=0 and u t (a t )>0 for a.a.t by (2.2) and (2.7). Thus the I.R. property of x implies that x t {0 for a.a.t. Then, by Lemma 1, x t >0 for a.a.t. From the Pareto-optimality of x, we conclude that there exists a measurable * and a vector p such that (ii) holds. By (2.5), clearly p>0.
From (ii) and the concavity of the u t (see (2.2)), we get
for all : # R n + and a.a.t. Now, for any allocation y, T y t d+= a t d+= x t d+ and therefore, by integrating the inequality u t ( y t )&u t (x t ) p } ( y t &x t ), it follows that T u t ( y t ) d+ T u t (x t ) d+, i.e. (iii) holds. Next we verify (i). Since, by definition, A(m) contains only bounded allocations, there exists K>0 such that &x t &<K for a.a.t; and, therefore, by (2.6) there exists :>0 such that u~t i (x t ) : for every 1 i n and a.a.t. Also, by (2.7), (2.3) and the fact that u~t(0)=0 for a.a.t, there exists ;>0 such that &x t &>; for a.a.t. So, for almost all t and t$ in T,
and thus
where the last inequality comes from the concavity of u~t $ . By conditions (2.2), (2.3) and the bound &x t & K of Lemma 2, we get that u~t(x t ) is bounded; and therefore * t Â* t$ is bounded for almost all t and t$ in T, proving (i).
Finally (iv) is obvious from (i).
Q.E.D.
Let H be a finite subfield of C. Denote by M(H) the set of all economies (a, u) in M such that a is measurable w.r.t. H, and u is measurable w.r.t. the product _-field H_B. Note that every such H is identified with a partition of T into finitely many measurable sets T 1 , ..., T k (the atoms of H) which represent the types of agents in the economy. A uniform field is a field H with all of its atoms, T 1 , ..., T k having equal +-measure, i. is a``market function'' (i.e. continuous, concave, and homogeneous of degree one).
If H is a uniform field, we distinguish a subset M*(H) of M(H), which consists of all those m in M(H) for which R m , f m enjoy the following properties: 
For S # C, define
Also define, for any real number q>1, the inessential economy e(q)=( q a, q u) by 
q a achieves w e(q) (R) for any R # C; from which it follows that (ii) z achieves w (a, u) (R) O (z, q a) achieves w (aÄ , uÄ ) (R).
Let S be a coalition in C with +(S)>0 and let P be a $-partition of
Let y be an allocation that achieves w (a, u) (S). Put x t =( y t , ; t ) where
Moreover, by Lemma 2 and the construction of qÄ , q>1+u t ( y t ). Therefore, ; t >1 for a.a.t. On the other hand, by (ii) and the construction of qÄ ,
so, by (iii), it follows that
and therefore, again by the construction of qÄ , ;
a t d+. This shows that V + (a, u)_e(q) (S | P)/V (a, u)_e(q) (S | P), for q>qÄ , S # C, and every $-partition P of S. The converse inclusion is obvious from the definitions.
Q.E.D. [8] ) that 4w m =&Ä . Therefore we have to prove that &=&Ä , where & : C Ä R denotes u x , i.e., &(S)= S u t (x t ) d+. Suppose &{&Ä . By (3.13) in [24] , there is a universal positive constant K such that, for every automorphism % of the measurable space (T, C) and every positive integer k, there are real numbers a k i with |a
By the triangle inequality it follows that there is a subset [14] , there is a +-measure preserving automorphism % such that
For every i, let % i H denote the field that is generated by % &i T 1 , ..., % &i T p and let
where, for any economy m=(a, u) in M and : in R ++ , the economy (a, :u) is denoted :m).
Let m Ä =(aÄ , uÄ ) be a one-commodity economy in M(H) with uÄ t (aÄ t )=(d&Ä Âd+)(t) and (duÄ Âdx)(t)| x=a Ä t =1. Then S uÄ t (aÄ t ) d+(t)=&Ä (S) for every S # C and w m Ä =&Ä . 
Remark 2. It is evident from the proof and our earlier remarks that Lemma 5 holds if we replace M by M$. Proof. Then p } x t Ep } a t Ep } Ae for a.a.t, i.e. x t # 2 for a.a.t. Since 2 is compact, x is uniformly bounded. We conclude that x # A(m). Proof. Let x # (m). Then x # A(m) by Lemma 6. By rescaling utilities if necessary and applying Lemma 3, we can assume w.l.o.g. that u x (T )= w m (T) where m=(a, u), and that u x =4w m . Therefore, for any positive q>1, (x, q a) # (m_e(q)). By assumption, .(m_e(q)){< and thus there exists ( y, b) # .(m_e(q)). By lemmas 8 and 6, ( y, b) # (m_e(q))= {(m_e(q)). Then (by Lemma 7) u t (x t )+ q a t =u t ( y t )+b t for sufficiently large q; and therefore (by the admissibility of .) (x, q a) # .(m_e(q)). The consistency axiom (ii) now implies that x # .(m).
EQUIVALENCE PRINCIPLE
Lemma 10. is admissible and satisfies Axioms A, B, C, D on M.
Proof. It is well known that satisfies A. By Lemma 6, coincides with the competitive correspondence {. It is obvious that { satisfies Axiom B. We shall next show that { satisfies Axiom C and is admissible. , p) , where p is the preference underlying u. It is clear that the admissibility of . on M implies the admissibility of . on M. Also from the fact that . satisfies Axioms I, II, III, IV it follows that . satisfies(ii) Consistency. We do not know what would happen if one were to drop just part (i) (or part (ii)) of Axiom C. But we cannot drop C in its entirety. Indeed, let H be the set of market games in pNA (see [8] ). Consider a uniformly continuous (in the BV norm) map ' from H to NA which satisfies Anonymity, Individual Rationality and Efficiency but violates Additivity. Take the domain of economies of Remark 5(a). Define a T-allocation x to be an``'-allocation'' of the economy m if there exists m Ä =(aÄ , uÄ ) with S uÄ t (x t ) d+(t)=('w m Ä )(S) for all S # C. Then the map m [ set of '-allocations of m, will be admissible and satisfy Axioms A, B, D but not C.
By way of another example, take the same domain and consider thè`N TU-Harsanyi value allocations'' defined in [19] (see also [17, 18] ). This map satisfies Axioms A, B, D (the last requires some checking) but not C.
(iii) Anonymity and Equity. The two axioms are intimately related. In the theory of TU-values (or indeed any other single-point solution, where .(m) is assumed to have cardinality one), anonymity implies equity, and is the stronger axiom. It has been the tradition to favour anonymity. This is particularly so in the standard axiomatic derivations of the TU value (on finite games, or various classes of non-atomic games such as (see [8] ) pNA, bv$NA, etc.), where anonymity is postulated, even though the weaker equity axiom would do equally well.
The only two instances we know, where anonymity can not obviously be replaced with equity, occurs in [24] and (for closely related reasons) in [14] (even if, in [14] , . is assumed to be a single-point solution). Our conjecture is that anonymity is indispensable in these two instances.
In our current NTU scenario, the set .(m) cannot be taken to be a singleton. Thus anonymity and equity become apriori independent axioms. We do not know if dropping either one of them would still leave our theorem intact. What is quite clear is that both cannot be dropped. Indeed, on the domain of Remark 5(a), consider the (non-symmetric) NTU-value , defined exactly as , but with 4 in place of 4, where 4 is as in Example 6.13 of [14] . Then is admissible and satisfies Axioms C and D, but neither A nor B.
Remark 6. Our theorem shows that competitive, core and value allocations are equivalent and satisfy Axioms A, B, C, D; and, indeed, any other solution coincides with them if, and only if, it satisfies these axioms.
A weaker result could be stated which would entail a seemingly more coherent (and more aesthetic?) proof. Restrict attention to value allocations as the concrete``reference case.'' A corollary of our theorem is:
